Nov. 4, 2025

Idriss Qibaa - The Stalker Who Sold Fear Online

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Show Notes
Transcript

Most people in 2025 would never just leave their front door open, their credit cards, or identity information just lying around, but many times, that's what we’re doing online, sharing so much personal information out on platforms like Facebook and Instagram, and we often don't give it a second thought.

For many shady people on the internet, that’s an opportunity to take advantage of unsuspecting people, including those who are older or less tech-savvy, as well as influencers, small business owners, and celebrities who have come to depend on their social media and have it tied to their brand.

These bad actors use their influence and skills to exert leverage and power over others, and in one recent case, use that power to threaten, humiliate, and destroy people’s reputations and livelihoods.

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We also cover the case of Daniel Reza who has been missing since 2019 in the area of Mount Charleston.
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Most people in twenty twenty five would never just leave

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their front door open, their credit cards or identity information

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just lying around, But many times that's what we're doing online,

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sharing so much personal information out on platforms like Facebook

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and Instagram, and we often don't give it a second thought.

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For many shady people on the Internet, that's an opportunity

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to take advantage of unsuspecting people, including those who are

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older or less tech savvy, as well as influencers, small

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business owners, and celebrities who have come to depend on

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their social media and have it tied to their brand.

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These bad actors use their influence and skills to exert

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leverage and power over others, and in one recent case,

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use that power to threaten, humiliate, and destroy people's reputations

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and livelihoods.

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Hi and Welcome to Sins and Survivors, a Las Vegas

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true crime podcast where we focus on cases that deal

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with domestic violence as well as missing persons and unsolved cases.

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I'm your host Sean.

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And I'm your co host John. This week we.

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Are turning to an area of John's expertise, technology and

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online safety. We did some Tech Corner episodes in twenty

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twenty three, back in our first season, and we said

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we'd returned to that when there was good reason to.

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So today we're highlighting a particularly bad actor who trapped

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unsuspecting people online with promises of account banning or unbanning

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on their social media, lock out recovery services for folks

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who were locked out of their accounts, and reselling personal information.

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So John, why don't you get us started with what

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you're talking about this week?

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The person we're talking about is Iddris Danny Kiaba, who

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is involved in some pretty sketchy activity. He was a

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twenty seven year old Moroccan national living in Las Vegas

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who in an interview said that as recently as twenty eighteen,

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he was working construction, living paycheck to paycheck and kind

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of living out of his car, and he just stumbled

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into this line of work, although he wasn't really clear

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about how that happened. He operated a business called Unlocked

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for Life under the name unlocked for life LLC, and

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he had a slew of different aliases that he used

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online in these various platforms. Danny is what his clients,

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or more accurately, his victims knew him by unlocked, unlocked

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for life on Instagram, and unlocked uncensored on Telegram. It's

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worth noting that all of those IDs seemed to be

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gone at this point, so you can't really find him

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on Instagram anymore. Or Telegram.

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You said Telegram, Can you explain what Telegram is for

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anyone out there listening who doesn't know.

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Telegram is a messaging app like WhatsApp or a signal.

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It's much less regulated than something like Meta's Facebook Messenger.

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It has no content moderation. It's encrypted for end to

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end privacy, just like Signal is. Anyone can create an

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anonymous Telegram user with no validation at all. You can

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create huge group chats and public channels to reach potentially

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millions of people. It also allows for self destructing messages

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like WhatsApp does, which disappear after a preset time, allowing

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for people to remove evidence. So it's like a mix

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of chat and a public feed. Legitimate businesses can use

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it too, but all of those features make it a

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popular place for scammers, food deal instolen data, and the

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kinds of account recovery schemes that Idris was running.

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So Idris kind of fell into this work, as he

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called it. So some of the services that his company,

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Unlocked for Life offered included were things like account banning

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or unbanning, or recovering locked accounts on Instagram, Snapchat or TikTok.

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And he said that he had special tools that he

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had developed and he had access to ins whatever that means.

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I know that you have some experience in losing an account,

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getting locked out of an account, so I thought that

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would be an interesting story for you to share with

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everyone here.

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I got a text message a DM in Instagram from

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someone I knew, and the message said, Hey, you know

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I'm having a problem with my account. Can you help

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me reset it? I need someone to read me the

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code after you click this link, ostensibly to get their

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password reset because it had been hacked. Well, in reality,

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what they did was they generated that link from my account.

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So when I clicked it and I gave them that code,

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it gave them the ability to reset my password, which

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they did, and then they changed my phone number to theirs,

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which I didn't know, so I couldn't reset it anymore

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because it wasn't going to send me a message anymore.

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And then when I messaged them from your account, they

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changed my handle entirely, so I didn't even know where

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it was. My account was basically gone. I had no

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idea where to find it or how to contact this

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person anymore, and for a while, it was just gone.

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I never considered going to an unlocked service or anything

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like that. But his goal, which I learned later, was

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to just keep repeating that process. So he would hack

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accounts like he did with my friend, and then reach

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out to people who that person was friends with to

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try to hack other accounts, and eventually he was hoping

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that he would get someone that would pay him to

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give them their accounts back, or he would reach someone

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who had a large following that had monetized their posts

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and he could use the audience.

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And I think, looking back on it, it was easy

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for you, as someone who works in tech and is

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known among your friends, to be someone who's like an

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expert on some level in social media, and it stuff

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for someone to reach out to you and ask for

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help with unlocking their account that that was. That was

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not something really uncommon.

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No, it was really common actually that people ask me

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for help all the time. Yeah, and I felt so

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dumb when my account got hacked. I felt so dumb.

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But it happens, and it was someone that I knew,

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and I actually ended up reaching out to that person

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afterwards and they were like, yeah, that person's collecting my

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followers accounts. Now. I eventually did get the account back

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because I happened to know somebody who worked at Meta,

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and they walked down and spoke to a database administrator

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who could change the ownership back to me after I

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sent them proof that I was actually me and I

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was vouched for by this person who worked there. But

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that's really rare. You can't really depend on that. It's

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hard to get in touch with somebody who works at Meta,

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so you can't really depend on that at all. But

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that's the only really official way to get an account

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back like that. So these services that promise they can

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get your account back are called trappers, and like I said,

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I didn't work with one of them, but they're very

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common and they're always trying to gain access to accounts

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with large followings and I'm not anywhere near the level

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of someone who Cabo would have gone after. He's more

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after celebrity accounts things like that, But he went after

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people with large Instagram audience as a large incomes from

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their social accounts, people that it could afford to pay

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him his ransom to get their account back.

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So for people who are older or not tech savvy,

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and even small businesses depend on their online presence, losing

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their social media account can just be the beginning. In

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many cases, the trapper turns out to be the one

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who hacked the account in the first place, and then

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they're turning around and offering account recovery services to the

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people that they hacked. So Idris went even further. He

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offered a scam of ongoing account protection, which was just

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an ongoing monthly fee to maintain account access. The types

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of accounts that it just dealt with were companies like dispensaries,

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people allegedly involved in selling drugs, not just your average person,

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and he would charge insane amounts like seventy five hundred

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dollars for account recovery and even more for the ongoing protection,

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which sounds to me like something you'd hear about the

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mafia doing to small businesses.

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Absolutely and around the time of a between April and

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June of twenty twenty four, the FBI Las Vegas Violent

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Crimes Task Force was investigating multiple victim complaints about Idris

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or the person who would turn out to be Idris,

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because they didn't know who he was at the time.

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They collected digital evidence, text threads, telegram posts linking Kiaba

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to threats, extortion, and docksing across several states. And that

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part's in port for later. We know all this because thankfully,

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he was arrested on July twenty fifth, twenty twenty four,

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right here in Las Vegas by the FBI after a

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criminal complaint and arrest warrant were issued. That complaint, which

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surprisingly just contains two counts of interstate threats, was filed

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in the US District Court for the District of Nevada.

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From there, he was taken into custody by the US

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Marshals after a grand jury indicted him. And if you're

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wondering how investigators finally caught him, the answer is simple.

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He told on himself. So remember that interview we talked

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about earlier. He went on a podcast called No Jumper

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with Adam twenty two. If you're not familiar with No Jumper,

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it's a podcast and a YouTube channel based out of

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la hosted by Adam twenty two. Like I said, he's

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known for interviewing rappers, internet personalities, and people from the

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corners of social media most of us kind of only

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ever hear about, sometimes controversial and sometimes just being honest,

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just plain weird. This show is a huge following, mostly

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because the guests tend to say things that they probably

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shouldn't say on camera, and that's what happened here. Iris

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went on No Jumper and essentially walked everyone through how

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his whole operation worked. He bragged about the money he made,

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the people he controlled, and what he could do to

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their lives online. He talked about how he charged people

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to restore their accounts, how he charged them protection fees,

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how he ran a reseller and a mentor program to

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train others, and how to do this. You can listen

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to that whole interview and hear him spilling all of

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the beans, and we will link that podcast episode in

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the show notes. So I mean a huge shout out

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to Adam twenty two for what he does. In his

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interview with Kiaba, Kiaba brag that he was making six

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hundred and twenty thousand dollars a month from his schemes,

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which was essentially extorting money from Instagram and TikTok users.

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He also talked about dealing in what's called TLOs, which

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were crucial in how he would dox people online.

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Will you please explain what a TLO is because I'm

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still not even sure what it is.

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Yes, So, a TLO report is often called skip trace data.

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TLO comes from the name of the company that originated it.

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It's called the Last One TLO. The Last One. A

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data pioneer named Hank Asher started that company TLO, and

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he created a next generation data platform which contained billions

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of public and proprietary records. TransUnion, the Credit Union, bought

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that company in twenty thirteen after Asher died, and they

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kept and rebranded the platform to TLOX, which is now

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called TransUnion Locator Service Expert Platform. It's a skip tracing

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tool that's used by debt collectors, investigators, law enforcement to

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locate people and verify identities and family relationships. So if

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you ever get a call from a debt collector and

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wonder how they could possibly get to you through your family.

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This is probably how they use credit bureau information, addresses,

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phone numbers, and public data, and it's only supposed to

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be available to those with legitimate reasons for accessing it.

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Kiaba did not have authorized access. The FBI affidavit says

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that he had posted samples of what he called TLO

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files on the website. Agents compared all of that with

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law enforcement databases and confirm that that data was all real.

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That means that he either bought the reports on the

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dark web, received them from someone with legitimate access, or

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used someone's leaked credentials within those systems, and we don't

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know which. So what did he do with that data?

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He re sold it on his website as intel packages

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or intel drops to other trappers for them to use,

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and that helped him build his credibility and clout in

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those shady circles. He would also post or threaten to

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post his victim's private data like names, addresses, social security numbers,

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relatives information, either on the site or on his huge

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channel on Telegram, and he would use them to validate

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his threats. So he would send screenshots or PDFs to

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the information to prove to people that he knew where

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they lived or what their social Security number was before

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demanding money. He basically used the files as leverage, proof

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that he could find you or ruin you or whatever

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it was if you didn't pay him.

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So most people don't even know what a TLO is

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or that it even exists. But this definitely blurs the

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line between losing an online account and perhaps being afraid

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for your life.

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Absolutely, he was engaged in cyberstocking, and I had no

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idea what a TLO was before I started doing this research.

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So it's really likely that most people have no idea

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what that is or even that it exists.

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Like you said, the criminal complaint had some examples of

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what he did to his victims, including screenshots of the

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text messages. All of his victims were only identified in

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the criminal complaint using their initials, and will only mention

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their initials here to protect their privacy as well. So

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here are a couple of examples from the criminal complaint.

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JT was a well known social media influencer who ran

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pages like Cali Plug and the Blacklist. Xyz Kiaba initially

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offered to sell him a username for around five thousand

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dollars when JT turned him down because of the price.

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JT's Instagram account was suddenly disabled and Kiaba demanded ten

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thousand dollars to restore it. JT eventually paid eighty five

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hundred dollars in cash to get the account back, but

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he still continued to be threatened. At a businessman from

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San Diego, paid Kiaba twenty five thousand dollars for the

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rights to the username at Ace, but never got it.

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When at tried to get his money back, Kiaba demanded

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one hundred thousand dollars instead, and the messages that followed

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included direct threats to eighty's daughter and other family members,

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and one final example, EH, a journalist and comedian, contacted

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Kiaba about her blocked Instagram and then was spammed with

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more than two thousand SMS messages. Kiaba told her that

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he had her solid security number and he would blast

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it out, demanding twenty thousand dollars to stop the attacks.

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As we said, Kiabo was tried in the district court

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here in Nevada. There really wasn't a trial because he

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pleaded guilty to two felony accounts of interstate threats, one

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for a Beverly Hills dentist he terrorized with hundreds of texts,

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and another for a Las Vegas landlord and realtor that

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he harassed after a rental dispute. Both involved threats that

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crossed interstate lines, which made them both federal crimes. Note

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that there were other victims that we didn't mention in

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the list, but the government pursued those that they had

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the most evidence for and reference to the other ones

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in the long list of victims to help show intent

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and build the case. He was sentenced to thirty six

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months in federal prison at Victorville Federal Correctional Institution, a

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medium security facility in Atlanto, California, and he will be

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released on February fourteenth, twenty twenty seven, and he will

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be around thirty one years old. He also had to

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pay a fine of seventy five thousand dollars and pay

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two hundred thousand dollars in restitution. We'll talk more about

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that in our Swing Shift overtime episode. But for a

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person who's pulling down six hundred and twenty thousand dollars

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a month in income from this work, it seems really light.

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So if you want to hear that discussion, head over

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to sincepod dot com. Slash subscribe and you can listen

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to that. The case here itself is interesting, but in

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reality our goal is to help people, and in this case,

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to talk through how this can affect you potentially and

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how you can protect yourself. There are a few simple

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things you can do to make yourself a harder target.

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First up, though, I want to remind you how you

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might be targeted by unscrupulous people online. You might be

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targeted by an account recovery or unlock scam, with people

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claiming that they can restore or somehow verify your social

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media accounts, and oftentimes it's going to be the same

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person who may or may not have attacked your account

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in the first place. You might be the victim of

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phishing or spear phishing or smishing. So those are fake

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emails or text messages that look like they're from banks

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or meta or the State of California Department of Transportation

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asking you to pay your moving violation or something like that.

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For example, I saw one recently from the California Toll

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road payments system. Allegedly it was a scam text that

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sends a link that steals credit card information. There's also

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social engineering DMS that's the one that got me. A

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friend of yours asks for help resetting their account, you

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click the link and you lose your account. There's also

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the family emergency or imposter call scam, where a scammer

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might call you and claim that a relative has been

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hurt or has been arrested, or owes money, or perhaps

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hit somebody with a car or something like that, and

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they will push you for payment in the form of

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a credit card payment or something like that. Sometimes they

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will even use AI cloned voices for that, so be

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aware of that. And then of course there's doxing and

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data abuse. Criminals can get personal data from leaks or

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skip trace databases like the TXP files that Kiaba used

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and use it to intimidate or extort. So how can

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you protect yourself? What I always tell people is never

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immediately click a link in an email or a text,

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even if they look real, unless you're one hundred percent

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what the source is. You have to look at the

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return address and hover over the link to make sure

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that the link is going where you think it is.

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But instead, to be safe, what you can do is

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just open a new browser window and type in the

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site directly. So, for example, if you get an email

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you're not sure it's real from Capital One, you can

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just open up a new browser window and go to

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Capital one dot com yourself and log in and see

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if it's real, or you can call Capital one and

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find out if it's real. That applies to text messages too.

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I very rarely click on a link that I get

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in a text message. Another best practice is to get

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yourself an authenticator app like Google Authenticator or Athy rather

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than using text message codes, because if someone steals your password,

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they can't access your account without that code. They could

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potentially clone your cell phone though, and get those codes

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for you. If you're using just text message validation, it's

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always important to use complex passwords that are at least

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twelve characters long, mixing upper lower case numbers and symbols,

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and change them frequently, and you can use a password

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manager like one password or bitwarden to keep them secure

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and unique. If you're looking to recover your account, that

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recovery is only going to happen through the official channels.

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So if it's a Facebook account or an Instagram account,

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that's only going to happen through meta. So HELPEDDI. Instagram

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dot com, Facebook dot com slash hacked, and they have

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pretty good tools for that. These days, no legitimate Meta

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employee will DM you to fix your account, and no

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one can verify you for a fee. We also recommend

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that you lock down your personal data, so we, for example,

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have all of our credit bureaus frozen so you can

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log into Experience, TransUnion and Equal Facts recommend you have

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an account with all of them, and if you freeze

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your account, it's free, reversible, and it stops new accounts

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from being opened in your name. We also use a

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data removal service called Incogni, but you can use delete

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me or any other data removal service that is reputable

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to reduce what data is available on public information sites

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like Peoplefinder and other broker sites. But essentially, just remember

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that if you're targeted by this sort of a scam,

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that fear and urgency are your red flags and they're

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your enemy. You have to slow down, confirm all the details,

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and verify through some other channel before acting. If you

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are targeted by a scam like this, make sure you

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don't just delete everything. Take screenshots of texts and URLs

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before deleting or blocking people, and report to the authorities

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You can report to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center

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at IC three dot gov. And for imposter or family

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emergency scams, you can report to Report Fraud dot FDC

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dot gov. And you can forward spam texts to seven

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seven two six Spam or just report them to your carrier.

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And remember, don't pay or negotiate. Extortionists are rarely going

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to stop coming after you for money after just one payment.

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And it's important that you mentioned if your credit is

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locked and someone claims they have your social number and

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they're going to make it public if your credit's locked,

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is that something that would scare you to make you

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pay urgently If you already know your credit is protected.

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You should never pay urgently. If someone tells you they

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have your social Security number, you should report that to

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the authorities. But yes, they can't open a new account

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and your name if all of your credit is frozen, absolutely,

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so you shouldn't act rashally if that happens. All these

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scams rely on all that urgency and fear and panic,

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so you just have to slow down, verify, and you're

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basically going to take away their power. Remember to think

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of your online accounts like you think of your home

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lock the doors, know who you let in, and don't

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trust strangers with the spare key. Remember to harden the target.

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If you're a hard target, most attackers will move on

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to someone easier.

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Those are really good tips show on this really helpful.

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